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Abstract: 
When do people focus attention on the self? Based on Gestalt notions of figure–ground assignment, two 
experiments demonstrated that making self figural against a background  induces self-focused attention. In 
Experiment 1, perceiving figural self-symbols increased self- awareness relative to perceiving background self-
symbols. In Experiment 2, making self figural against the background of a 6-person decision-making group 
increased self-awareness. These experiments clarify the antecedents of self-awareness and connect objective self-
awareness theory to research on interpersonal deviancy. Keywords: self-awareness, self-focused attention, 
distinctiveness, figure–ground, deviance 
Article: 
When the Self Stands Out: Figure–Ground Effects on Self-Focused Attention 
Objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Silvia, 2001; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) connects the self to 
motivation and activity via self-focused attention. Directing attention toward self affects a broad range of 
psychological processes. Self-focused people can evaluate the self against  standards of correctness (Scheier & 
Carver, 1983). If people fall short of their standards, they  make attributions for the resulting discomfort. 
People might eventually accept or deny responsibility for failure, blame others for their own failings, or 
avoid self-focus (Duval & Lalwani, 1999; Duval & Silvia, 2002; Moskalenko & Heine, 2003; Silvia & Duval, 
2001a). 
Despite the large literature on the effects of self-awareness, relatively few experiments explore the 
antecedents of self-awareness. Many experiments have manipulated self-focused attention and measured its 
direct and interactive effects on a host of dependent variables. Few studies, however, have explored what makes 
people self-focused in the first place. Given the importance of self-awareness for self-regulation and motivated 
cognition, understanding the antecedents of self-focus is essential. The present experiments thus address this 
issue. 
What Makes People Self-Aware? 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggested many creative ways of manipulating self- awareness, and 
many new methods have been developed since then. Despite their apparent  diversity, all manipulations of self-
awareness try to make the self salient by directing attention  onto some aspect of the person. The best-known 
manipulations do this bluntly, by showing  people their faces in mirrors (Carver & Scheier, 1978) and video 
monitors (Duval, 1976), by playing recordings of people’s voices (Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 1973), or by 
introducing observers (Scheier & Carver, 1983). Other ways to direct attention to the self include writing self- 
descriptive essays or completing personality scales (Brown, 1988; Fenigstein & Levine, 1984). 
One source of self-awareness is based on Gestalt perceptual principles (Köhler, 1929).  Duval and 
Wicklund (1972) reasoned that making the self figural against a background of other people—making the self 
―stand out‖—would increase self-awareness. For a field separated into regions, the smaller region will be figural 
and thus attract attention (Koffka, 1935). Attention is predicted by the ratio of the smaller area to the larger area. 
The figure–ground approach has not been widely studied. In one experiment, the researcher calculated the 
participant’s astrological diagram (Mayer, Duval, Holtz, & Bowman, 1985). Some people learned that their 
diagram was shared by half of the population; others learned that their diagram was unusual. People feeling 
figural relative to the population took more responsibility for helping someone in need. Other experiments 
manipulated self-focus by asking people to describe how they differ from their  friends and relatives (Eichstaedt 
& Silvia, in press; Silvia, 2002). Relative group size affects group dynamics in a manner consistent with self-
awareness theory (Mullen, 1983; Wegner & Schaefer, 1978). These studies can be interpreted in figure–ground 
terms, but they are nevertheless indirect tests. 
It is unfortunate that figure–ground effects on self-awareness have received little  attention. The 
well-known ways of making people self-aware are uncommon in everyday life—few people work in front of 
large mirrors or video monitors—and these methods are  relatively non-social. Figure–ground effects, in 
contrast, illuminate social contexts of self- awareness. People often feel distinctive relative to their social context, 
such as when they have an unusual feature (e.g., tokens and deviants; Frable, 1993). Figure–ground principles 
thus connect self-awareness to interpersonal processes, an area in which the theory has not been widely 
applied. 
The present experiments manipulated a situation’s figure–ground structure and then  measured self-
awareness. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the relative frequency of symbols of the self. Some people viewed 
self-symbols—personal pronouns—that were figural against a background of non-self symbols; others viewed 
figural non-self symbols against a background of self-symbols. In Experiment 2, we manipulated figure–ground 
status in an interpersonal context. Some people were distinctive within a group, whereas others were not 
distinctive. The  experiments extend past research on the sources of self-awareness by demonstrating that 
making the self stand out relative to the context will increase self-focused attention. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses at the University of  Southern 
California volunteered to participate and received extra credit. People were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: an I-figural condition or an I-ground condition. 
Procedure 
The participant was escorted into a small room that contained a table and chair. A 9" × 9" × 9" cube of 
wooden blocks was on the table, with a sign that read ―Please do not disturb (Exp. 00-04-978).‖ The sign was 
meant to give the impression that the cube belonged to a different  study. The face of the cube had nine blocks 
printed with an I or a They. In the I -figural condition, an I was on the center block in the grid and surrounded 
by eight They blocks (Figure 1, top  panel). In the I-ground condition, a They was on the center block and 
surrounded by eight I 
blocks (Figure 1, bottom panel). The experimenter expressed concern about the cube, but he said that it would 
probably be okay to use the room. The experimenter explained that the study’s  purpose was to examine the 
properties of spontaneous thinking. The participant’s task was to complete a worksheet designed to assess ways 
in which people think spontaneously. 
Before giving the worksheet to the participant, the experimenter decided to make sure  they could stay 
in the room without interruptions. He left the room and made a bogus phone  call, audible to the participant. 
During the call the experimenter made it clear that using the  room was a problem. The purpose of this 
procedure was to leave the participant facing the cube for 60 seconds without any other visual distractions. After 
completing the call, the experimenter returned and said that they would have to move to another room. 
After moving, the participant completed the ―Linguistic Implications Form,‖ a measure  of self-awareness 
(Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). This scale consists of sentences that lack pronouns. Participants choose the pronoun that 
they feel best fits the sentence. The choices consist of 1 self- relevant pronoun (I, me, or my) and two filler 
pronouns (e.g., she, they). One item, for example, reads ―Someone stopped (them, me, us) to get directions to 
the stadium.‖ The dependent  measure is the percentage of sentences completed with self-relevant pronouns. 
The sentence- completion task is among the most widely-used measures of self-focused attention. Unlike other 
measures, it enables a comparison of the level of self-focus relative to a level expected by chance. If people 
select pronouns randomly, 33% of their selections will be self-relevant pronouns. 
Results and Discussion 
First, we tested whether people in the I-figural condition chose more self-relevant  
pronouns than participants in the I-ground condition (see Table 1). As predicted, viewing I in a 
figural position was more self-focusing than seeing I in a background position, t(38) = 3.06, p < .004, d = .97. 
(Effect sizes were calculated with MINSIZE 2; Morse, 1999). Second, we tested whether the percentage of self-
relevant pronouns selected in each condition differed from chance (33.3%). A one-sample t-test found that the 
percentage of self-relevant pronouns chosen in the I-figural condition significantly differed from the percentage 
expected by chance, t(19) = 3.54, p < .002, d = .79. The percentage of self-relevant pronouns chosen in the I-
ground condition, however, did not differ from chance, t(19) = .77, p < .45, d = .17. 
The experiment’s results thus demonstrate a figure-ground effect on self-focused  attention. We 
should note that the findings are inconsistent with a simple priming explanation,  in which viewing the pronoun 
I primed selecting self-relevant pronouns. People in the I-ground condition viewed the most Is and hence should 
have had a stronger priming experience, but they selected fewer self-relevant pronouns. 
Experiment 2 
Our first experiment found that the figure–ground status of self-symbols influenced self- awareness. 
Experiment 2 replicated these effects in an interpersonal context. Showing that  ―sticking out‖ in relation to a 
social group increases self-awareness can connect self-awareness theory to interpersonal phenomena, such as 
deviance (Frable, 1993). To avoid creating  discrepancies on important dimensions, we created figure–ground 
differences that involved noncentral aspects of the self. People were in a decision-making group that used 
different colors of paper. Some people thought that they would be the only group member with yellow paper; 
other people thought that half the group, including the self, would use yellow paper. This dimension  does not 
involve features central to the participants’ self-concepts, and most people probably 
lack standards regarding paper color. 
Experiment 2 created a stricter test of the figure–ground hypothesis by using a more conservative 
comparison group. People in the figural condition had a feature that was unique among the six people (1 vs 5); 
people in the not-figural condition had a feature that was shared by half of the six people (3 vs 3). In this 
condition, the self should neither stick out nor merge into the background. As a comparison, recall that 
Experiment 1’s figural condition (1 vs 8) was contrasted with a condition in which the self-symbols formed the 
background (8 vs 1). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Twenty-four students enrolled in General Psychology at the University of North Carolina  at Greensboro 
(UNCG) participated as part of a research option. People were randomly assigned  to one of two conditions—
figural and not -figural—using randomized blocks. 
Procedure 
Participants arrived in groups of six. The experimenter seated them at individual tables in a large room. 
He explained that the experiment was about the dynamics of group decision- making and the many factors that 
might influence group processes. In particular, the experiment ostensibly focused on aspects of the physical 
environment that might affect group interaction.  The participants expected to complete some questionnaires 
individually and then to work  together on a problem-solving task. The task was a ―winter survival task,‖ in 
which the group had to decide which objects should be selected to survive a snowstorm. Each participant received 
a description of the task along with a ―Pre-Task Questionnaire.‖ The questionnaire was ostensibly intended to get 
background information on each person’s attitudes, opinions, and personality 
traits, so that the dynamics of the group’s discussion could be better understood. The  figure–ground 
manipulation was carried out in the description of the group decision-making task. People read that different 
groups would work under slightly different conditions, in order  to find out which conditions promoted the 
best decisions. The description emphasized that  many of the differences were slight and unimportant but 
were included on an exploratory basis. 
Participants read that their group would move their desks into a circle so that all  members could see 
each other, whereas some other groups would work with their desks in two parallel rows. Likewise, some groups, 
such as their group, could take notes during the discussion, whereas other groups could not take notes. Among the 
groups that could take notes, different  colors of paper would be distributed to see if taking notes on unusual 
colors of paper could affect the group’s decision processes. Participants in the figural condition learned that they 
would write on yellow paper and the other five group members would write on blue paper. Participants in the not 
-figural condition learned that three group members (including the participant) would write  on yellow paper 
and three group members would write on blue paper. (Blue and yellow are  UNCG’s school colors.) All 
participants learned that the different colors of paper were randomly determined and did not indicate different 
levels of status or different functions in the group. 
A full-color diagram followed the instructions. This diagram depicted the arrangement of the desks 
according to each group member’s color of paper. An arrow pointing to a yellow  square noted ―You.‖ Figure 2 
shows a black-and-white version of the two diagrams. In the figural condition, one square was yellow and the other 
five squares were blue (top panel, Figure 2). The infrequency of self in relation to the social field should make self 
appear figural and the other five people appear as the background. In the not-figural condition, the six squares 
alternated between 
three yellow and three blue squares (bottom panel, Figure 2). After reviewing the figure–ground information, people 
completed a measure of ―expressive fluency,‖ actually the sentence- completion measure of self-awareness 
(Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). 
Results and Discussion 
Self-focus was computed as in Experiment 1 (see Table 2). As predicted, people in the figural condition 
reported higher self-focus relative to people in the not-figural condition, t(22) = 2.16, p < .042, d = .88. We then 
tested if each condition differed from the percentage of self- relevant pronouns expected by chance (33.3%). The 
figural condition differed significantly from the chance level, t(11) = 4.62, p < .001, d = 1.33. The not-figural 
condition differed marginally from chance, t(11) = 1.92, p < .08, d = .55. Experiment 2 thus replicates and 
extends Experiment 1. Like the first study, it found that making self figural increases self-focused attention. 
Moving beyond replication, Experiment 2 demonstrated figure–ground effects on self-focus in an interpersonal 
context. Finally, Experiment 2 found the effect using a non-central aspect of self and a more conservative 
comparison condition, in which self was neither figure nor ground. 
General Discussion 
A large literature describes the effects of self-focused attention (Silvia & Duval, 2001b), but few studies 
have systematically addressed the antecedents of self-focus. The present experiments tested whether figure–
ground processes affect self-focused attention. A few studies have used manipulations based on relative 
magnitude, but there has been no systematic look at how figure–ground principles influence the intensity of 
self-focused attention. Both experiments—using different manipulations of figure–ground—supported the 
figure–ground approach. In Experiment 1, perceiving I in a figural position was more self-focusing than 
perceiving I in a background position. In Experiment 2, perceiving that an aspect of self is figural within a social 
group increased self-focused attention. Both experiments directly support the figure–ground hypothesis and thus 
fill a gap in the self-awareness literature. 
We do not view figure–ground methods as causing a qualitatively different ―type‖ of self- awareness. To the 
contrary, objective self-awareness theory has long maintained that self- awareness is a unitary construct that 
can be manipulated many different ways (Duval &  Wicklund, 1972). As we noted earlier, methods of 
inducing self-awareness rely on making the self salient. Figure–ground assignment is one way to direct 
attention to self. Statistical  infrequency renders an aspect of self salient, such that it seems to ―pop out‖ of the 
surrounding situation. The basic dynamics involved in self-awareness should be the same, regardless of the 
inducing event. 
The present findings suggest parallels between self-awareness and deviancy, the  experience of 
differing from others (Freedman & Doob, 1968). Deviants are more likely to take their interaction partner’s 
perspective (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990), to describe themselves as unique (Frable, 1993), and to 
have lower self-esteem (Frable, Platt, & Hoey, 1998). According to the present experiments, deviants should be 
more self-focused than non-deviants. Congruent with this position, the effects of manipulated self-awareness 
parallel the effects of deviancy. Self-focused people show increased perspective-taking (Stephenson & 
Wicklund, 1983), describe themselves as unique (Ickes, Layden, & Barnes, 1978), and sometimes experience lower 
self-esteem (Ickes et al., 1973). The figure–ground approach is a promising way of bridging these literatures and 
thus extending self-awareness theory into interpersonal domains. 
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